Will the Real Mike Griffin Please Stand Up?
PRESS RELEASE Date Released: Wednesday, November 19, 2008 Source: Space Frontier Foundation - Comments
NASA Administrator Griffin Contradicts Own Congressional Testimony
The Space Frontier Foundation today pointed out that NASA Administrator Dr.
Michael
Griffin, in an interview with CBS News published last Friday, publicly
contradicted his own
2003 testimony to Congress about the safety of flying humans on America's
Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs). "It's one thing for Mike to argue that EELVs
can't send
astronauts all the way to the Moon. But on Friday he claimed that EELVs are not
safe
enough, even for the easier job of launching astronauts to Earth orbit, and
that's just not
true," said Foundation Chairman Berin Szoka.
"Just five years ago, Mike testified to Congress that EELVs were safe enough to
launch
astronauts to low Earth orbit. And the only thing that's changed since then is
that the
Delta IV and Atlas V systems have, together, successfully flown 20 times," Szoka
added.
In the CBS News interview published on Friday, November 14th, Dr. Griffin
defended his
plan to invest roughly $10 billion in taxpayer funding to create the new Ares 1
rocket,
rather than using the existing, proven EELVs, saying "our selection was based
first and
foremost on crew safety ..." But on May 8, 2003, Dr. Griffin testified to the
U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Science, rejecting suggestions that EELVs were not
safe
enough for human spaceflight. Dr. Griffin declared that no additional
precautions, beyond
a safety abort system, were necessary.
GRIFFIN: What, precisely, are the precautions that we would take to safeguard a
human
crew that we would deliberately omit when launching, say, a billion-dollar Mars
Exploration Rover (MER) mission? The answer is, of course, "none". While we
appropriately
value human life very highly, the investment we make in most unmanned missions
is quite
sufficient to capture our full attention. Logically, therefore, launch system
reliability is
treated by all parties as a priority of the highest order, irrespective of the
nature of the
payload, manned or unmanned. While there is no EELV flight experience as yet,
these
modern versions of the Atlas and Delta should be as inherently reliable as their
predecessors. Their specified design reliability is 98%, a value typical of that
demonstrated
by the best expendable vehicles. If this is achieved, and I believe that it will
be, and given
a separate escape system with an assumed reliability of even 90%, the fatal
accident rate
would be 1 in 500 launches, substantially better than for the Shuttle.
